In what is itself part of Goethe's inheritance from the Enlightenment, he dramatises social and cultural history in terms of alternating progressive and retrograde periods, in which he seeks, as in his morphology, a pattern of recurrence. In the case of the history of science, he discerns two tendencies at work from its earliest recorded history, which he identifies by associating the one with Plato, the other with Aristotle (HA, 14, 54f). These two poles -"two parties" (Goethe 1982 , 14, 55) -provide the dynamic of scientific progress, "the driving force" of science-history (Fink, 1991, 53) , and it is to the credit of his own age, Goethe contends, that the two are still held in (albeit precarious) balance.
That Goethe himself was attracted by, indeed felt an affinity for, the Aristotelian tendency (Wachsmuth 1941, 16) in no way affects the balanced presentation he offers in his Theory of Colours of these two poles -the "Platonic" -mechanistic (that is, tending to abstraction) and the "Aristotelian" -dynamic (tending to concretion) -at work in the development of Western science (Groth 1972, 60) . In fact, the whole narrative he intends to retell, he announces early on in the "Historical Section", is merely a "commentary" (Goethe 1982, 14, 58) Clearly, such a view of history is cyclical -or, rather, helical -in conception, as he points out at the very beginning of his account:
The circle that mankind must tread, is sufficiently limited and, despite the great standstill that barbarism effected, has more than once completed its course. If we ascribe to it, in addition, a spiral movement, then it return recurrently to places it has already passed through. All true views and all errors are repeated on this path (Goethe 1982, 14, 7). Innovation, then, for Goethe consists in the refinement and transformation of inherited thought; rather than coming out of nowhere, a scienza nuova, a view that had been the received wisdom since at least Nicolo Tartaglia, the sixteenthcentury mathematician, had coined the phrase to designate the positivistic sciences (and that is still current enough today to be asserted as self-evident by a recent writer on science, described as having "suddenly exploded all about us"; Appleyard 1992, 4). Progress is conceived by Goethe as a move from general to ever more specific, with recourse to theorising only when enhanced conceptual subtlety is required to account for the increase in detailed knowledge (Goethe 1982, 13, 64) . Like any other human enterprise, science (as he also remarked to Eckermann, 23 October 1828) is characterised by regressions: "The sciences have developed in a remarkable way, but by no means in a steady progress, not even step-by-step; but rather through ups and downs, through linear or helical progressions and regressions" (Goethe 1982, 14, 58) . Moreover, the historical record is full of lacunae (Goethe 1982, 14, 51) , which make the anyway highly problematic business of writing history (Goethe 1982, 13, 320) even more difficult. What is provided in the "Historical Section" is readily acknowledged as no more than a "sketch" (Skizze; Goethe 1982, 14, 55) whose redeeming value is that it outlines those "crucial turning-points" (Hauptmomente; Goethe 1982, 14, 56) Goethe speaks of his own heuristic methodology as the projection onto the external world of an "intimated rule": "there is something unknown, yet lawful, in the object which corresponds to something unknown, yet lawful, in the subject" (Goethe [1907] 1976, 69, and 227). There is not much doubt that this is Pre-Socratic. It is certainly not Schellingian; the "unknown", whatever else it is, is not an Idea, an object of rational cognition. It is, rather, precisely what Goethe calls it, an imaginative heuristic tool that directs attention to the world. But since it is "unknown", it can scarcely be the basic component of his theory of knowledge that some have seen in it. Like Spinoza's thought, the Pre-Socratic doctrine is functioning here as a congenial framework for Goethe; and, as in the case of Spinoza's metaphysics, "all particularities escape [it]" (Goethe to F. H. Jacobi, 9 June 1785). The essence of reification 2 for Goethe is to mistake abstract disembodied structure for concrete, embodied form. Looking for the Universal qua abstraction in the Particular is, for him, always such an act of reification, since the particular and the universal are, from the standpoint of aesthetic perception, simply names for aspects of a concrete reality. Intellectual certainty is, for him, a category-mistake; the Pre-Socratic formula of an (unknown) Self finding itself in an (unknown) Nature is merely an adumbration of the problem as are all such abstract formulae -and no solution.
Certainty is rather an aesthetic quality of embodied feeling, a valuation that occurs at every level of interaction between subject and object. The pure abstraction to which
Platonists aspire is, for Goethe, simply impossible to attain: both what he calls the "empirical" and the "scientific" phenomena retain something of the sensuous matrix - within the open-ended, cyclical, process of ever more specific (and ever more theorized) insight which underlies his own scientific method -just as "Understanding" (Verstand) and "Reason" (Vernunft) will do duty for each other, in order to indicate similarly the continuous refinement of intellect that necessarily accompanies this procedure (Goethe [1907 (Goethe [ ] 1976 . Although Goethe agrees with modern science that the senses are fallible, he does not join in its headlong flight from the sensuous world (Heisenberg 1967, 425) . Standing in a tradition that has continued into the twentieth century, 3 Goethe calls, by analogy with Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason, for a "Critique of the Senses":
Kant has drawn our attention to the fact that there is a Critique of Reason, that this -the highest faculty we possess -has cause to be self-aware.
What great advantages this voice has brought, everyone will have tested, it is to be hoped, in respect in themselves. I, however, would, in the same spirit, like to throw down the challenge that a Critique of the Senses is necessary. (Goethe [1907 (Goethe [ ] 1976 His play here on the homonym Sinn (which translates well enough into the English "sense") underlines Goethe's conviction that meaning is fundamentally, and intrinsically, sensuous. What saves this epistemological stance from collapsing into solipsism is the constitutive, formative, function he ascribes to the objective medium of the senses, which, for the artist and investigator of nature alike, consists in the physical, bodily experience of the aesthetic phenomenon, either actual or imagined ( or remembered). Feeling arises when sensuous impression is answered by evaluative response, whether it be visceral or visual. For Goethe, meaningless experience is a contradiction in terms. Nature speaks to us through our senses, he tells us, in the 1810
Preface to his Theory of Colours -perhaps the most magnificent passage in the whole of his scientific writings -famously defining colours as "the acts of light, acts and sufferings" (Taten des Lichts, Taten und Leiden):
Close your eyes, prick up your ears, and from the softest sound to the wildest noise, from the simplest tone to the highest harmony, from the most violent, passionate scream to the gentlest words of sweet reason, it is but Nature who speaks, revealing her being, her power, her life, and her relatedness, so that a blind person, to whom the infinitely visible world is denied, can grasp an infinite vitality in what can be heard. (Goethe 1982, 13:315) In So the aesthetic phenomenon is revisited in experiment, but now its appreciation is heightened by a much more exact grasp of detail.
The geometric shapes that the mind lends to objects, the phenomena, strictly speaking, do not have; the latter exist rather in clusters constituted by their prehension of each other. And these relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of sensuous apprehension as the things themselves. Phenomena endure by repetition of pattern, or better rhythm, of relations -by form, which is the diagram, as it were, of the force of polarity. Sensuous elements sustain their identity, magnet-like, through the attraction-and-repulsion of polar opposites. This fundamental rhythm we make out through the ceaseless bombardment of our sensorium by these Elemente. Sensation is the mere inarticulate feeling of their presence, or rather, of their "penetration" of the sensorium -the key idea in Goethe's doctrine of sentience. A few months before he died he noted in his Diary: "If only one could become sufficiently penetrated by the micro-megic of Nature, one would attain soon enough to many a concept" (11 June 1831).
The body is, then, not simply an instrument of the rational will -as, say, it appears in Kant's moral philosophy. The body for Goethe is the site of our sensuous interactions with the "external" world, and as such the necessary medium of our knowledge: "it is astonishing," he writes to Frau von Stein from Italy (1 February 1787), "how difficult it is to learn to see without using one's own hand." What grows out of his experience of nature and observation of her products -and this is crucial to the coherence of his "sensuous-intellectual" theory of knowledge -is what he calls a "a way, a technique of sensing" (Sinnesweise; Goethe 1982, 13:41 (Bullough 1957, 145) . The senses have, after all, developed in and for the external environment: "the eye has light to thank for its existence" (Goethe 1982, 13:323) . They are, then, themselves techniques of the body, developed to cope with sensate stimulus. Traces of the impacting object These traces of the surface of things -"after-images" (Nachbilder) Goethe sometimes calls them -are the residue of physical contact left in the form of techniques, in the sense of habituated responsive adjustments by the organism in its passive-active confrontation with matter. These physical adjustments have (relatively simple) form -"sentience gives to imagination clearly circumscribed, definite forms (Gestalten)", he writes to Maria Paulowna, 3 January 1817. This fact accounts for the "charm"(Reiz) that natural phenomena exert (Goethe 1982, 13:255) . In a wholly characteristic transformation of the Pre-Socratic metaphysical dictum that "depth speaks unto depth", Goethe lends the formulation specific content: "form (Gestalt) speaks to 'forms of like form' (gleichgestalteten) " (Goethe 1919, II, 46:276; cf. Goethe [1907 cf. Goethe [ ] 1976 . 4 What we, as (admittedly highly complex) forms, need do is "eavesdrop" on nature (Goethe 1982, 13:36) . For Nature "deigns to speak to … senses, known, ignored, unknown" (ibid. 315-6). These "elements" penetrate us in the sense that they leave their traces in our senses in the form of fixed, physical adjustments, isomorphic with their elemental shape; such after-traces can barely be controlled, and exercise "human mind, cunning, and courage": they are
"arbitrariness" itself (Willkür); and if it were not for the fact that we register the polarity that animates them, we should not have a clue as to their nature (Goethe 1919, II, 12:102-3) . Being so near to elemental Nature -being in it and of itsentience is ruled by Nature. Therefore, sentience, in order that some degree of complexity may be grasped, "raises itself to imagination" which, though distanced from Nature is, in its workings, nonetheless very close to her (Goethe 1947, 1, 10:251) .
In the case of human perception, then, a faculty (itself a mental technique) is developed, according to Goethe, to accommodate the sensuous in-rush, and to coordinate the more localized techniques -"senses" -developed to deal with it immediately. This faculty, he variously refers to -reflecting both its genesis and its multi-functioning -as the "sense-power" (Sinnkraft), or the Memory, or the Imagination. Like the sense-organs, the faculties, too, have a genetic history in which they took their form in functional response to Nature, and, as such, their form and function retain the impress of Nature. In that sense, Imagination is "more akin" to Nature than our senses because as a faculty it has retained more of the complexity of Nature's working by dint of co-ordinating at a higher level a multiplicity of lowerorder sense-organs (ibid.). In contrast to the intellectual faculties of Reason and Understanding, which are too distant, and the senses, which are too close, Imagination, in its "productive," aesthetic modality 5 , is at the optimal distance from
Nature. But what inspires Goethe's trust in this faculty, not only in art but in science, with its tendency, as Francis Bacon has it, to "exceed the measure of nature, joining at pleasure things which in nature would never have come together … making unlawful matches and divorces of things"? (Gilbert and Kuhn 1939, 219) . It seems especially odd in view of the "arbitrary" nature of the elemental traces imagination is appointed to govern. The answer brings us into the very heart of Goethe's scientific endeavour, to that nodal point where he seeks to justify his having deployed his artistic gifts in the service of the investigation of nature. Imagination may seem to have no rules, but it in fact obeys aesthetic judgement -"which is the way Reason masters all matter, all elements" (Goethe 1919, II, 46:396) . Aesthetic experience, then, is the indirect way by means of which ("subjective") Idea and ("objective") Experience converge.
Goethe's trust in imagination stems from two aspects of its workings: first, imagination works with after-images which are as close as we ever get to nature's materiality; second, in its aesthetic modality, imagination works with every other faculty. Just as the Newtonian scientist depends on the inter-subjectivity of the scientific community to test the objectivity of data, so, Goethe is suggesting, the inter-faculty testing of the products of imagination gives grounds for relying on this co-ordinating, faculty, which when functioning alone, admittedly, cannot achieve "truth" and "integrity" (see his letters to Frau von Stein, 7 November, and to the "subordinate" role that Schiller envisages for the aesthetic as the prime matter, as it were, on which the intellect goes to work in order to produce concepts and theory; there is the "co-ordinate" role as direct object of enjoyment; and there is its "superordinate" role in gracious living (Wilkinson & Willoughby 2002, 233-68) . In this third case, a "Third Realm" (or, to use a biological analogy, an ambient) is envisaged by Schiller, one created by interlacing the texture of those outward, physical, and observable aspects of milieu and person that are in any case already subordinate to purposeful action: a perceptible aesthetic form is thereby created, one that clothes and sustains activity and on to which -as on to any aesthetic object -the free and dynamic play of the inner life can be projected and released. Symbolic expression is, therefore, not only possible, on this theory, within the privacy of one's own inner life or in the communal sharing of artistic appreciation. It is also at work in the manner and style of any and all public actions. Schiller does not share the post-Kantian Idealist's faith in Geist, in the sense of a Reason to which Nature is to be subjugated. It is true that the sense in which Kant is an "Idealist", in holding that an Idee (a Vernunftbegriff -a "concept of reason") may regulate reality, is also Schiller's, and Schiller also uses the word ideal, beyond the ordinary notion (of perfection), to mean "having existence only as an idea"; but, since on his and Goethe's theory, Art articulates Geist (only as a synonym for Gehalt -"felt import") in the broad sense of "the inner life" (das Innere), "Kunst des Ideals" (" Ideal Art", Aesthetic Education, Letter II, paragraph 3 & Letter XXVII, paragraph 1) is not "perfect art", nor is it "intellectual art" (presenting a concept of reason), but art replete with significant (i.e., symbolic) import.
It is this insistence that the import (Gehalt) of art and of all aesthetic phenomena is more than intellectual, even if its material (its Inhalt) is wholly or partly intellectual, that distinguishes the "Idealism" of Weimar Classicism from that of those Romantics who subordinate Art to Philosophy (and Religion).
Herders, 10 November 1786). Within the mind, during aesthetic experience, the imagination "penetrates" every other faculty.
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Aesthetic experience reveals the real world -for all its elemental dynamism -to be ordered by similarly rhythmic patterns as are at work within us: in the same way as we feel tension, intensity, and resolution (Polarität, Steigerung, Spezifikation), so the universe, too, evinces these processes. If art can hold up the mirror to this otherwise inexpressible life within us, why, Goethe is asking, should it not be helpful to turn the principles, learned about art through practice and theory, outwards on to nature, and so complement a one-sidedly analytic approach? But, unlike say Schelling, Goethe is not seeking any kind of transcendence in his science: 7 Nature's incredibly complex processes are seen to be utterly unlike the logical structure of "Ideas"; if they are like anything, it is the complex processes at work within human beings, but at a much more primitive level than rationality. Goethe's injunction to the natural scientist is "to seek nothing behind phenomena" ("nichts hinter den Phänomenen suchen"; Goethe [1907] 1976, 116) . The attempt to reach with mind what can only be achieved through bodily means is the very cause of that most Romantic of maladies, nostalgic longing (Sehnsucht). Admittedly, once a cycle of investigation has resulted in the perception of the "laws" governing a phenomen's self-sustaining existence, a feeling of awe supervenes. The living order apprehended in the particular leads to reflexion on the whole of which the particular is but a part; and the particular aesthetic perception may well serve as an analogue of the whole, enabling the researcher to engage in that intellectual love of God that Spinoza held consisted in an insight into the dependence of all things on the whole of nature. Such sublime speculations are not, however, part of aesthetic experience proper; rather they are its possible by-product, leading, as Spinoza's phraseology suggests, to intellectual development rather than to directly renewed observation. The aesthetic perception of nature remains an earthly symbol, reflecting back to human observation, an analogue of human feeling: "forms speak to forms" (ibid. 208). The revelation of pattern in the object is at once a revelation of self; but not a fusion such as a mystic might seek in loss of individuality. 8 Rather it is more like the intensification of self experienced in reciprocated human love: its objectivity -like the reality of love for those involved -is unquestionable: it consists, quite blatantly, in its having the defining characteristic of all living form (Gestalt), a palpable sensuous, bodily existence.
The onward march of exact science can do no harm to the progress of what we might call Goethe's "Science by Acquaintance" so long as there are individuals willing to practise it. So long, that is to say, as the Platonizing tendencies of Western thought do not become so all-powerful that the abstract Universal wholly displaces experience of the concrete Particular, and is mistaken for reality. When he speaks of "identity" he has in mind, as he strives to make his exquisitely expressive language show, not the Platonic universal, but the unique, distinguishing patterns of individual organisms, overlapping across species and genera, without any individual therein losing its individuality (Goethe 1982, 13:164) . When he speaks of "the universal"
(das Allgemeine) he is exploiting the very form of the German word: "all-common", a ubiquitous rhythm of contrasts, one that characterizes without homogenizing. Only in this sense can he endorse Aristotle's alignment of the two poles of the philosophical pair, universality and particularity: "the particular eternally succumbs to the universal, and the universal eternally has to adapt itself to the particular" . . . "the universal and the particular coincide: the particular is the universal appearing under varying circumstances" (Goethe [1907] 1976, 49, and 115).
Goethe is not simply making the metaphysical point that each term in the pair is a coimplicate of the other. He is saying more: that both, qua conceptual terms, are inadequate to the perplexing complication that characterizes real entities-ininteraction in Nature. The harmony Nature achieves is not a bland, neat, set of equivalences; it is, like the harmony of great art, an asymmetrical co-ordination of opposites: "equilibrium in inequality, opposition of similarity, harmony of the dissimilar" (Goethe 1982, 12:133) . In Goethe's universe, there are no perfect Forms; only beautifully-formed imperfections.
The potential cultural benefits of Goethe's way of "eavesdropping" on nature are very considerable. Increasingly, since the Renaissance, the mechanistic world-view has furnished Western culture with the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm of what constitutes scientific knowledge. As Ernst Cassirer puts it, the mechanistic cosmology "has become the medium within which the human spirit has developed its own selfknowledge" (Cassirer 1932, 48) . Even the historical approach has become a neglected aspect of the equipment of the scientist, indeed of many non-scientists, prompting a prominent historian to call for a "stereoscopic vision," combining genetic-diachronic with ontological-synchronic modes of thought (Bullock 1990, 27 ).
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Such a blending of simultaneity and succession, so congenial to himself, Goethe declared, would seem like insanity to the positivistic mind (Goethe 1982, 13:32) .
Indeed, to the mind nurtured in a mechanistic medium -the modern mind, according to Cassirer -Goethe's insistence on the difference between mere "detail" (dismissed by conceptual thought) and the unique particular (available only to aestheticosensuous apprehension), obvious enough to anyone familiar with the arts, would, he claims, seem nonsensical: "anyone born and educated in the so-called exact sciences will not easily grasp from the heights of his rational intellect (Verstandesvernunft) that
there can be such a thing as an exact-sensuous imagination (without which art would 
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If the increasingly widespread cultural opposition to a qualitative approach to nature is to be countered, a medium has to be found, or devised, in which the insights gained in aesthetic perception could be transmitted in a way that appeals not only to the intellect. Because, by virtue of its particularity, the occasion of Anschauung is unique, it can never simply be repeated, only re-enacted with a degree of variation (though this is kept to a minimum in experimentation). The problem of the communication of what is not susceptible of discursive expression -the Urphänomen -is a problem with which Goethe wrestled from at least his discovery of the "primal plant" (Urpflanze) in 1787. While "there is no substitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality" (Whitehead 1926, 248) , there is, both Goethe and Whitehead insist, a means available for fostering such apprehension of the self-manifesting Urphänomen, namely aesthetic education.
In characterizing Goethe's Farbenlehre as "the novel of European Thought," Thomas Mann highlights two related aspects of Goethe's scientific writing, each of which accounts for its abiding importance (Mann 1948, 40) : on the one hand, Goethe's deliberate, self-conscious placement on his own work within the whole length of the history of western science; on the other, the literary quality of his writings on nature.
The reader is encouraged by Goethe's employment of a metaphorical language couched in the figurative use of the simplest operations of nature, such as polarity to "see" with the mind's eye what the scientific experimenter has observed with the physical eye (Goethe 1982, 13:488-93) : "if [a book that deals with natural phenomena] is to be enjoyed, if it is to be used, then nature must be present to the reader, either in reality or in vivid imagination" (Goethe 1982, 13:321) . Besides its imitative and productive functions the faculty of imagination has (Goethe to Knebel, Goethe 1982, 13:31), Goethe seeks to appeal to this capacity, enabling his reader to store the impressions thus gained in memory, until they yield for the reader what they have yielded for the original observer. Given Goethe's acute awareness of the severe limitations of language in expressing natural and aesthetic process, it is hard to accept that all he had in mind, as critics have suggested (Fink 1991, 50) , is the deployment of rhetorical figure, in conjunction with his overtly narrative representation of both observation and growth.
When he laments, as in his letter to Frau von Stein, 9 July 1786 (as he so often does throughout the length of his scientific and cultural writings; e.g., Goethe 1982, 13:103) an inability on his part to communicate precisely what he has so joyfully experienced, he clearly has more in mind than the rhetorical mastery of figures of thought and speech, however precise. In his own case, all reasoning transforms itself into a kind of presentation (Darstellung) as he contemplates the form and colour of the world (Goethe to Schiller, 15 November 1796) . To reproduce this effect in his reader, he needs to exploit more than method and manner. To induce in his reader a state of mind in which thought and perception become one, Goethe's presentation must re-enact, in its very style, this co-ordinated equilibrium, something entirely foreign to discursive language, however metaphorical and however evocative, because discourse appeals first and foremost through meaning (through concept) making its imaginative effect a secondary, subordinate matter ("mere metaphors" as Goethe dismissively puts it in the Farbenlehre [Goethe 1982, 13:492] ). As he claims in his essay, "Simple Imitation of Nature, Manner, and Style" of 1789, style rests on the deepest fundaments of knowledge, on the very things themselves, in as far as we are permitted to know them in visible and tangible forms (Gestalten; Goethe 1982, 12:32) . Martin Walser has argued that "we owe the awakening of the German language [to] Goethe's insistence on vision, on what one feels, perceives" (Walser 1989, 36) . Certainly, it is through the revivification in and through powerfully aesthetic language -in a word, through literature -that Goethe recreates for his reader the delight of participating in natural creativity. And the long historical dimension that he evokes, not only in his pioneering Geschichte der Farbenlehre, but throughout his cultural and scientific writings, is an attempt on his part to bring home to his reader his own conviction that such intimate experience of Nature, as of Art, is directly proportionate to our grasp of the potentialities inherent in our culture. As in Faust, recognition of the diachronic temper of his theory of culture is crucial: in order to uncover ever greater significance in perceived reality, we must increasingly build the symbolic riches of our cultural inheritance into our everyday perception (see Stephenson 2001, 244-47) . Or, as he puts it in his West-östlicher Divan:
Who of three thousand years An account is unable to give,
Remains in the dark without experience
And must a trivial existence live. (Goethe 1982, 2:49) In a barely veiled attack on his contemporary, the physicist Albrecht Haller, in a poem of 1820, the opening stanza highlights the cant-phrase "into the inner world of Nature" (taken from a philosophical poem of Haller's published in 1730):
"Into the inner world of nature" -Oh, you philistine! "Penetrates no created spirit."
The likes of us You don't need to remind Of such words:
We think that, wherever we are,
We're always already in the midst of nature. (Goethe 1982, 1:359) Useful only as rhetorical expedients, spatial metaphors are utterly misleading if taken to be accurately descriptive of nature (Goethe 1982, 13:43) . For that reason he chooses Propylaen as the title for the cultural periodical he launched in 1798, because the Greek term denotes the room between inner and outer, the border-line, as it were, at which natural processes have their being (ibid. 12:38). Nevertheless, he relies upon spatial tropes himself quite heavily, remarking that "everything that has to confront life, everything that is to be actively effective, must have a covering skin" (Hülle;
ibid. 59). For all his reservations, he is clear that science must have a language at its disposal that enables it to talk about problems in manageably practical ways.
In an essay of 1823, appropriately entitled Problems, he insists that, while it is impossible to represent in expositional, didactic language the ubiquitous simultaneity of oppositional forces at work in nature, one can yet envisage an "artificial discursive practice" which could intimate at least something of it, beyond the limitations necessarily imposed by our inveterate tendency to one-sidedly visual metaphor, and hence to abstraction: "We really have to entertain the introduction of an artificial discursive practice (ein künstlicher Vortrag). A new symbolism would need to be put in place. But who would do it, and who acknowledge it if it were (ibid. 36)?"
Whatever else this symbolism might consist in, it would need to match in some degree the subtle delicacy of connectedness that characterizes Nature's syntheses; only then would it count as the longed-for "representation according to Nature" (naturgemässe Darstellung; ibid. 313). Rhetoric, he remarks (Goethe [1907 (Goethe [ ] 1976 , is as careless of qualitative values as is mathematics. While he is intensely aware of the need to present his material in such a way that is will be placed in its proper historico-rhetorical context (writing, for example, on the history of both the manuscript and the printed version of his Metamorphosis of Plants), he never gives the slightest indication that his undoubted mastery of (mainly spatial) rhetorical and dialectical strategy is anything other than an approximation to the reality he is seeking to communicate. Analogy, for example, he uses to considerable effect, as has often been noted. But he is under no illusion that analogy, "which, like good company, stimulates rather than gives anything" (Goethe [1907 (Goethe [ ] 1976 , is symbolic, in the highest sense in which an Urphänomen is symbolic. All formulae derived from human evaluation, he regrets to say are "mere likenesses" (blosse Gleichnisse; Goethe 1982, 13:492) . Like the visual aids of illustrative drawings and colour-plates, which he provides in many of his scientific texts, they are merely supportive correlatives of discourse, helpful but in no way sufficient (Goethe [1907 (Goethe [ ] 1976 . They, like all comparisons, are the product of, and a support to, the imagination in its "circumspect" function, not in its symbolic, productive mode (Goethe to Knebel, 21 February 1821) .
Even the very best metaphors (he adds in the same letter) only seem to cover the object in hand. His criticism of Descartes's account of colour does not turn on the regrettable "crudity" of the metaphors that he employs; Goethe's point is more substantial:
Descartes does not seem to dwell in the objects peacefully and lovingly in order to gain something from them. He snatches at them in haste as soluble problems, and approaches them mainly from the angle of the most complicated phenomena. (Goethe 1982, 14:111) Above all, according to Goethe, Descartes lacks the (aesthetic) imagination-at-adistance that, in Goethe's view, is essential. As a result he seems to lack any symbolic resource. Even the most appropriate metaphors of all, those of polarity (Goethe, 1982, 13:493) , only "come close" to nature; they are "near-relatives" (nahverwandt); but their rhetorical effect is one of "relief" not expressive fulfillment (ibid. 316). Likewise his decision, in the face of the impossibility of articulating the "character" of a phenomenon (Wesen), to tell instead the "story" of its growth and development is, as he is very well aware, as much an inadequate approximation as any other discursive gambit:
For strictly speaking we try in vain to express the intrinsic character of a thing. All that we become aware of are effects, and a complete history of these effects would at least presumably comprise the character of that thing. (Ibid.315) The narrative mode of exposition has certain advantages that he is keen to exploit. It places scientific investigation firmly in the socio-cultural world, and its history, leaving the laboratory with its strained artificialities behind; and, perhaps above all, it evokes the everyday world of human feeling and valuation, and brings the reader into that relationship with nature that Goethe dubs "ethical" (sittlich), by which he means "in terms of human values" seeing it as a prerequisite for the kind of science, indeed culture in general, for which he stands. But, the language of the theatre employed throughout 10. Nah und fern und fern und nah;
11. So gestaltend, umgestaltend -12. Zum Erstaunen bin ich da. (Goethe 1982, 1:358) A full reading of this poem is not called for in the present context. What is of importance here is the way in which a scientific "idea" -better, an aesthetic insight into an Urphänomen -is re-enacted in the body of language. What is made manifest to our senses and our mind (our imagination, in the productive, aesthetic sense that Goethe employs) is a tension between, on the one hand, the neat symmetry of intellection operating through linear time and, on the other hand, the awe-inspiring asymmetry of the ever-changing, yet recurring, patterns of nature.
11 What is at work in the German text is that "style" Goethe held could be learned, like any technique or skill, in intercourse with nature: the co-ordination of semantic values with the very bodiliness of language, its sound and look and shape. In the first four lines, intellectual experience, for example, is made to look and feel like a linear process by means of the perceptible parallel of line three: "to research, to experience" (zu erforschen, zu erfahren). Here the two phrases in German are almost identical in sound-look structure; it is this, not any association of discursive meaning, that makes them seem to be (almost) equal stages in the process of natural investigation. This apparent symmetry of time-bound intellectual activity then gives way to the asymmetrical dynamism of Nature. The chiasmus of the seventh line is, in its sensuous linguistic shape, defective: each leg of the figure, "small, small, big, big"
(klein, Kleine, Grosse, gross) is marred by one element's having an 'e' that its partner lacks: the perfect mirroring effect of the chiasmus is thereby blurred. In the penultimate line, the polyptoton, "shaping-reshaping" (gestaltend, umgestaltend), again links antithetical terms in a way which, because of the intrusive particle "um" in the heavily stressed position after the caesura, feels (sounds and looks) out of balance.
But, if this is all that there is to "presentation according to nature", the problem remains acute. For the space at the centre of Goethe's didactic exposition would remain empty, except for a few magnificent philosophical poems which he could, and did, publish in quite unscientific contexts. His scientific writings thus might well seem to fail his own test of adequate testimony -if it were not for the evidence, in the prose itself, of a definite aesthetic stylization. In order to reconcile literary intention with his clear communicative purpose, it is necessary, as I have argued elsewhere, to adduce the theory of "aesthetic discourse" (schöner Vortrag) that Schiller developed during his collaboration with Goethe. 12 Two distinct modes of language are combined
into one in what Schiller calls schöner Vortrag. There is the conceptual structure, in 11 A prose translation here of Goethe's poetic writing may help bring out some of the significant points: "Many years ago, my mind was exercised, joyfully and eagerly, in researching and experiencing how Nature lives by its own creativity. And it is the eternal One that reveals itself in manifold forms: small is the great, and great is the small, everything according to its own character. Ever-changing, preserving itself; near and far and far and near; thus shaping, reshaping: I am here to marvel." 12 See Stephenson 1983, 157-208, and Stephenson 2002, 34-35. which other, non-conceptual, features are subordinated to the logical relations ("logical" here in the Kantian sense of having reference to intellectual knowledge);
and, on the other hand, there is the poetic in which conceptual relations are coordinate with all others. These two modes -the logical and the aesthetic -themselves co-exist in a relation of reciprocal subordination, so that the reader may take the piece of discourse as either communicative or expressive depending on need and capacity. It is this reciprocally subordinative relation of logical and aesthetic that constitutes "aesthetic discourse" proper for Schiller (and Goethe) , and that firmly distinguishes it from the complete fusion that occurs in poetry, where a purely co-ordinative relation is at work. This theory implies that the bodiliness of language (such as the inscape examined above in respect of the poem "Parabase") has in aesthetic discourse a double function. It both establishes perceptible, sensuous links between terms (as in poetry) and serves to emphasise conceptual relations already established (as it traditionally functions in rhetoric). In the first case, the sensuous medium is coordinate with the discursive meaning; in the second, subordinate to it. A sampling of Goethe's literary and scientific texts will illustrate the point that, rather than the full assimilation to medium which the poems introduced into his scientific works represent, the only partial assimilation that constitutes schöner Vortrag is much more characteristic of his style in scientific and scholarly writing alike.
The capacity of the German language to express, "in prose or poetry", not only any object of discourse but also the felt life of the subject, had, Goethe remarked, reached in his lifetime the point where such articulation could be attained with ease (Goethe 1963, 14 :400). We should not, then, be surprised to find the combination of masterly evocative rhetoric and poetic co-ordination in his prose writings in general. For example, in commenting in 1816 on Ruysdael's painting, The Convent, Goethe highlights the painting's import as the representation of the Past in the Present, a thought which he embeds in the detail of his prose style: "The second picture", he writes, "which has become famous under the title of The Convent, has a similar intention in a richer, more attractive composition: to present the Past in the Present;
and this is achieved most admirably, establishing the most vivid connexion between the dead and the living" (Goethe 1982, 12:139) . 13 The alliteration and homeoteleuton in the original German, however, do more than underline the rhetorical chiasmus of Present (Gegenwärtigen)/Past (Vergangene)/Past (Abgestorbene)/Present (Lebendigen); they also fuse the apparently opposite elements into a perceptual nexus, into an aesthetic articulation of that "Eternal Moment" to which the fifth stanza of the poem "Vermächtnis" of 1829 (using similar techniques) gives classic expression: But the duty, merit, and dignity of a genuine artist consists precisely in keeping the branch of art in which s/he works separate from others, in understanding how to establish each art, and every genre, in itself, and how to isolate it as far as possible. (Goethe 1982, 12:49) 15
Working with a Kantian-Schillerian rhetoric of associated antitheses -"inclination" (Neigung), "duty" (Pflicht), "dignity" (Würde) -Goethe is out to make the point that, though they are related, the different kinds of art should not be confused. He concedes as fact that the arts and their sub-genres "incline" to coalesce (in that Verschmelzung Friedrich Schlegel famously championed in his 116th Fragment), while insisting on the Artist's "duty" to keep them as distinct as possible. What is of particular interest here, from the stylistic point of view, is the way in which an intense bewundernswürdigste erreicht, das Abgestorbene mit dem Lebendigen in die anschaulichste Verbindung gebracht." 14 "Enjoy with moderation the fullness and blessings of this world; let reason be present wherever life enjoys life. Then the past is stable, the future alive in anticipation, and the moment is eternal." 15 "Eines der vorzüglichsten Kennzeichen des Verfalles der Kunst ist die Vermischung der verschiedenen Arten derselben. Die Künste selbst, so wie ihre Arten, sind untereinander verwandt, sie haben eine gewisse Neigung, sich zu vereinigen, ja sich ineinander zu verlieren; aber eben darin besteht die Pflicht, das Verdienst, die Würde des echten Künstlers, daß er das Kunstfach, in welchem er arbeitet, von andern abzusondern, jede Kunst und Kunstart auf sich selbst zu stellen und sie aufs möglichste zu isolieren wisse."
impression is created, in the body of language, of this tendency to coalesce: anaphora links "connection" (verwandt), "unity" (vereinigen), and "loss" (verlieren), while homeoteleuton connects "relation-amongst" (untereinander) and "interrelation-in" (ineinander), and jingle on the little particle ei[n] brings "unity" (vereinigen), "inclination" (Neigung), "interrelation" (ineinander) and "relation-amongst"
(untereinander) together. Unity is thus made to feel like entanglement. On the other hand, the participation (by virtue of its initial syllable in German) of "merit"
(Verdienst) in this tangled web expresses the otherwise difficult-to-articulate idea, that an Artist's merit consists in sustaining the tension of entering into the inclination of her/his chosen art-form to unite with others, while "as far as possible" sustaining its maximum autonomy.
In his cultural commentaries, as in his writings on colour and on metamorphosis,
Goethe on occasion draws attention to the aesthetic dimension of his prose by playfully juxtaposing poetry to it. In his "Well-Intentioned Reply" (Wohlgemeinte Erwiderung) of 1832, for instance, the (untranslatable) delicacy with which the advice is given to young writers, that the Muse is glad to accompany but unable to direct life, is contained in the enhancement of this antithesis by the polyptoton-play on the element, leite: "how difficult it is to get across to talent of every kind and every level that the Muses are glad to accompany, but do not know how to guide, life" (Goethe 1963, 14:401) . 16 And, just in case, as it were, this "heartfelt" sub-text has not been registered (namely, that though direct intervention is not to be expected of the Muses, guidance may be hoped for), Goethe ironically closes the prose piece with a little verse (Reimwort) in which the same aesthetic figure, and the same import, is emphatically repeated: "Young person! Remember at times when your mind and senses are elevated, that the Muses know how to accompany but not how to lead" (ibid:402).
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The case for Goethe's awareness of the inherent instability of discursive language -because of its intrinsic abstraction, even on its most (illusorily) "concrete" levels -is very well and structure. The conceptual relations of intrinsicality, identity, priority, and reciprocity, articulated on the propositional level, undergo, on the aesthetic level, a subtle but profound change. The "foreignness" of ideas stands in marked contrast to the familiarity of actual experience. And then in the last term of each series there is a reversal of this pattern: a Fremdwort (Phänomene) designates the real world, while a German word (Lehre) designates the world of ideas. The aesthetic effect of all this is that a felt-thought is given expression, namely that "foreignness" of ideas is as much a part of experience as experience is a part of thought: what in propostional discourse is reduced to logical relations is here presented as the felt admixture that Goethe attempted to point to in the much-quoted paradox, "experience is but the half of experience" (nur die Hälfte der Erfahrung; ibid: 187).
Here, in nuce, is the principle uniting Goethe's science with his art: that of "binary synthesis", in which the name of one element in a pair of antitheses can fairly be applied to their synthesis, since it represents a richer concept, tending towards one of the original antitheses in an ascending hierarchy. For what is being expressed is the idée maîtresse that animates his whole scientific-cum-literary project, namely that "experience" is entirely compatible with "idea"; indeed, that their co-operative interrelation, without the one ever being confused with the other, is productive of everascending (binary) syntheses, which we may name, indifferently, "EXPERIENCE" or "IDEA", depending on whether we wish to stress one or other of the related elements in such higher synthesis (which the upper case here is meant to indicate). One of Goethe's fundamental contributions to his collaboration with Schiller consisted in the subtle modes of thought and presentation that he had developed over many years since he first became fascinated with hermeticism and "mystical-cabalistic chemistry" (Goethe 1982, 9:414) and that he went on to apply in his scientific work. Of particular relevance here is Goethe's (and later Schiller's) adoption and adaptation of a variation of the principle of coniunctio oppositorum, known as "binary synthesis" (see Cirlot 1962, 26, and 145-47.) , of which William James offered a precise analysis in a discussion of mystical modes of writing:
The keynote [of this dark saying] is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world … were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the
